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As most analysts have pointed out recently, 
the  most  important  element  which  came 
to  the  fore  during  the  electoral  unrest  in 
Iran, was the divided political and religious 
landscape within the country. This situation 
is  not  new,  but  finds  its  roots  within  the 
earlier years of the Islamic Republic. It is the 
evolution of power centralization that made 
a more authoritarian rule possible, created 
a  determined  yet  divided  opposition,  and 
clipped the wings of clerical involvement. At 
the same time, not much seems to change for 
the position of Iran in the Middle East. 
Of Revolution and Evolution...
On 12 June 2009, the tenth presidential elections 
were held in Iran. After the victory of Mr. Mahmud 
Ahmadinajad  was  made  public,  and  formally 
endorsed by Supreme Leader grand ayatollah `Ali 
Khamana´i, protest rose. The reformist opposition, 
who gathered behind Mir Hussein Musavi, accused 
Mr. Ahmadinajad of large scale manipulation of 
the elections, and claimed victory. These protests 
grew into the most serious riots in the existence 
of  the  young  Islamic  Republic,  with  people 
asking for new elections and, later on, demanding 
greater  personal  freedom.  After  some  weeks  of 
trying to calm down the protests and urging for 
national unity, the regime organized a mass crack 
down. On 5 August, Iranian president Mahmoud 
Ahmadinajad was sworn in for his second term. 
The ceremony was boycotted by different elements 
of  both  the  reformist  side  and  the  religious 
establishment. Western countries recognized Mr. 
Ahmadinajad as the elected president, but refused 
to  send  congratulations.  While  the  opposition 
keeps on calling for protest, fears of government 
reprisals are rising.
The  most  important  lesson,  as  many  observers 
have  already  pointed  out,  is  that  the  elections 
have exposed the cracks in the Iranian political 
landscape. There is indeed a greater fissure between 
the regime and the opposition, which concerns 
the very orientation of Iranian society. It would 
be wrong, however, to see these developments as 
a completely  new reaction against electoral fraud 
or authoritarianism – let alone as a demand for 
western-style democracy. The current situation is 
the immediate result of older political processes 
in  Iran.  At  different  stages  in  the  history  of 
Revolutionary  Iran  the  state  power  has  been 
transferred  to  a  group  which  is  becoming  ever 
smaller,  in  an  attempt  to  streamline  a  post-
revolutionary society. This project was to be the 
immediate cause of the current fissures within the 
establishment.
The  evolution  of  power  centralization  already 
started under grand ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini 
in  1988,  when  he  introduced  the  notion  of 
Vilayat-i Mutlaqa-yi Faqih (‘absolute ruling of the 
jurist’), the idea that in state affairs the rulings of the 
Supreme Leader have more importance than the 
shari`a, thus giving the Leader enhanced religious 
legitimacy when acting. Years before, the imam 
had already purged the Iranian establishment of 
radical, less pragmatic elements holding ideas of 
exporting revolution by force. 
The  breaking  point  came  with  Khomeini’s 
sidelining  of  grand  ayatollah  Muntazari,  who 
continued to criticize the violent and repressive 
politics  of  the  Iranian  state,  and  the  Supreme 
Leader,  accusing  him  of  renouncing  the  ideals 
of  the  Revolution.  The  eventual  successor  of 
Khomeini  and  current  Supreme  Leader,  grand 
ayatollah Khamana´i, did not enjoy the approval 
of the entire religious establishment, given the fact 
that he was only a hujjat al-islam at the time of his 
appointment, becoming an ayatollah overnight. A 
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couple of months before his death, Khomeini had 
stipulated that a Supreme Leader did not have to 
be a senior cleric; the one who best understands 
the  problems  of  his  time  was  the  most  fitting 
choice. 
Grand ayatollah Khomeini’s measures were largely 
accepted by the Iranian establishment, given his 
charismatic  personality.  Ayatollah  Khamana´i 
however, did not possess such legitimacy within the 
clergy. Moreover, during the years of his reformist 
presidency, a secular trend was developing within 
the  middle  class  youth.  As  a  consequence  he 
sought to bolster the regime by relying on military 
factions such as the Pasdaran and Basij and radical 
ideologists  such  as  the  Haqqaniya  school  of 
ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi. A product of these ‘neo-
conservatives’  was  Mahmud  Ahmadinajad,  who 
surprisingly was elected president in 2005, to the 
detriment of ayatollah Rafsanjani. Not only was 
he able to grant the Supreme Leader the support 
of the security services. He also pursued a policy 
of  centralizing  more  power  in  his  person,  by 
removing different important conservative actors 
from their positions, and replacing them with his 
own loyalists. Thus a profound rift was generated 
between  pro-  and  anti-Ahmadinajad  factions 
within  the  conservative  ranks  itself,  forcing  the 
latter into the opposition. This approach seems to 
be confirmed after the elections. The list of names 
for mr. Ahmadinajad’s new cabinet, submitted on 
20 August 2009, seems to follow the same pattern, 
placing Pasdaran loyalists in strategic places.
The Iranian presidential elections of 2009 can be 
seen as the most recent pinnacle of an evolution 
in  which  the  Islamic  Republic  has  gradually 
transformed  into  an  autocratic  entity,  with  the 
Supreme Leader as the central figure, and with 
president Ahmadinajad as a factor in keeping the 
political opposition at bay and impersonating the 
new  found  political  power  of  security  services 
such as the Basij and Pasdaran. After the elections 
of June 2009, the regime does not only seem to 
confirm  this  trend,  but  also  risks  going  a  step 
too far in this evolution, isolating itself from a 
disapproving mass. Question remains, is there a 
viable alternative? 
Opposition and its Limits
Nowadays,  the  impression  exists  that  the 
opposition in Iran stands united against a common 
foe, behind Mr. Musavi.  In reality the opposition 
is too diverse in its political orientations – from 
the Islamic Left over the Technocratic Right to 
displeased  conservatives  –  to  be  effective.  This 
lack of uniformity and the fact that the opposition 
speaks mainly for Iran’s young middle class, both 
rule  out  a  durable  alternative  for  the  current 
regime.  At the end of July, Mr. Musavi stated that 
he planned to create a new social movement, with 
the goal of forcing a different orientation within 
the political system. The main way of achieving 
this would be the unison of the different political 
views within the current opposition. Such a project 
will not prove to be easy as it remains a blunt fact 
that trustees of Mr. Ahmadinajad occupy most of 
the strategic positions. 
Apart from some radical elements in the religious 
establishment,  such  as  circles  surrounding 
ayatollah  Muhammad  Masbah  Yazdi,  the 
religious circles in Qom seem to have given up 
on the regime, which they see as undermining the 
theocratic system. But even here the same story 
goes: there is no serious opposition to be expected, 
since  the  Shiite  clerics  of  Iran  depend  heavily 
on the financial and material support from the 
office of the Supreme Leader. This did not stop 
grand ayatollah Montazari, who was once to be 
the successor of Khomeini and who is known as 
a harsh critic of vilayat-i faqih, from coming to 
the  fore  again  to  ventilate  his  frustration  with 
recent developments by means of fatwas, and this 
on several occasions. But even though his personal 
standing  in  the  Shiite  world  remains  great,  his 
advanced age (87 years) makes an important role 
for him in the future unlikely. Sayyid Muhammad 
Khatami  and  his  network,  who  were  already 
seriously limited in their actions during his last 
term,  seem  to  play  a  mostly  symbolic  role,  as 
figureheads of reform. The call for the formation 
of a shura, a consultative council of clerics with 
mere  advisory  function  in  order  to  replace  the 
position of Supreme Leader, is also raised again. 
This stance is an old, traditionalist interpretation 
of vilayat-i faqih, sustained by former critics of the 
Republic’s orientation such as ayatollah Montazari 
and  the  shirazi  clerics.  It  will  certainly  have  a 
renewed appeal in the light of current events, due 
to the mirage of a more secular society which it 
raises.  The  question  remains  whether  this  will 
prove a serious alternative: Qom has lost political 
clout, clerical opinions remain divided on how to 
interpret the vilayat-i faqih, and there is no actual 
demand  for  replacing  a  theocratic  government 
with a secular one – indeed clerics fear its demise. 
Ayatollah  Rafsanjani  currently  appears  to  be 
playing a dual role as the only opposing religious 
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Khamana´i, based on his revolutionary credentials 
and  close  relations  to  Khomeini.  During  the 
entire post-election contestation, he has profiled 
himself as defender of the Iranian state ideals, by 
conducting politics in a most balanced manner. 
On the one hand, he has aligned himself with the 
opposition, calling the current situation in Iran a 
major crisis and the violent silencing of protesters 
as opposite to the ideals of the Islamic Republic. 
At  the  other,  although  implicitly  criticizing  the 
Supreme Leader, he avoids a direct collision course, 
referring to their long friendship. As head of the 
Council of Experts, Ayatollah Rafsanjani denies 
undertaking  efforts  to  remove  grand  ayatollah 
Khamana´i.  The  major  problem  for  Rafsanjani 
remains the aura of corruption connected to his 
vast  wealth,  which  costed  him  the  election  in 
2005. Both Mr. Ahmadinajad and the reformists 
have added to this perception in the past. 
Consequences for Iranian Foreign Influence?
Now the discrepancies within the Iranian political 
and  religious  establishment  show,  are  there  any 
possible consequences for Iranian foreign policy in 
the Middle East? Some analysts go as far as saying 
that the discredit suffered by the Supreme Leader 
will have a negative effect on some islamist groups 
or parties that emulate grand ayatollah Khamana´i 
as their marja` and have extensive ties with his 
office. It may have a slight influence of course, 
but it is highly unlikely that we shall see great 
modifications in the popularity of these groups or 
in their allegiance to the Islamic Republic. 
First of all, as we have stated above, grand ayatollah 
Khamana´i  has  never  been  the  most  popular 
mardja` in Iran, or Shiism for that part. So, the 
reasons why islamist groups such as Hezbollah or 
the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq maintain ties 
with the Iranian establishment, are rather inspired 
by very practical considerations such as financial 
or material support for their respective national 
goals. A possible tainted reputation of the Supreme 
Leader is not enough to damage these relations. 
Let us not forget that having obvious ties with 
Iran rather counts as a handicap in Arab countries 
than it is an asset. Hezbollah for example enjoys 
great  popularity  in  the  streets  of  (often  sunni) 
Arab countries ‘in spite of’ its Iranian patrons, not 
‘because of’. 
Secondly, as a result of this since the 1980s the 
Islamic  Revolution  has  moved  away  from  the 
radical foreign policy of exporting her revolution 
manu  militari.  The  country’s  ambition  remains 
the expansion of regional influence. Iran therefore 
prefers  political  stability  in  its  neighboring 
countries, and the preferred way to achieve this 
is national inclusion of its allies and participation 
in  the  local  political  scene.  Known  examples 
are  Hezbollah,  that  ‘Lebanized’  after  the  Ta´if 
Agreements, or ISCI, that adapted considerably to 
the Iraqi political scene after the 2005 elections. 
These groups or parties seem to have developed a 
greater autonomy and have fitted themselves into 
their respective national contexts. 
Over the long term, such a situation might pose 
risks  to  the  Iranian  influence  in  the  countries 
involved, when her allies’ existence will depend 
on  the  choice  between  further  nationalization 
and  their  allegiance  to  Iran.  Also,  maintaining 
these  foreign  relations  will  put  serious  pressure 
on  Iranian  economy,  forcing  these  groups  to 
safeguard  their  own  income.  For  the  moment 
however, it all seems to work out, with Iran having 
a foot in the region, giving sympathizing parties 
a maximum of autonomy. ISCI proved this on 
12 July by intervening in the Ashraf camp, thus 
tightening its grip over the Iranian Mujahedin-i 
Khalq opposition group in Iraq.
Regarding  the  most  important  Shiite  clerics 
outside  Iran,  one  can  not  notice  harsh 
criticism on the developments surrounding the 
Ahmadinajad  re-election.  Therefore  little  effect 
on their bonds and the bonds of their followers 
with Iran is to be expected. The most popular 
marja`  at-taqlid  in  the  shiite  world  today, 
grand  ayatollah  `Ali  as-Sistani  of  Najaf,  seems 
to remain silent on the matter, which entirely 
fits  into  the  tradition  of  political  reservation. 
Grand  ayatollah  Muhammad  Hussayn  Fadl 
Allah  of  Lebanon  does  not  seem  to  voice  his 
stance regarding the legitimacy of the presidency 
of Mr. Ahmadinajad, but has high regards for 
the  election  process  in  Iran1.  Shaykh  `Abd  al-
Amir Qablan, president of the Lebanese Higher 
Islamic Shi`a Council, has openly congratulated 
president Ahmadinajad.2 Important to know is 
that  these  clerics  are  not  known  as  supporters 
of grand ayatollah Khamana´i and mostly try to 
profile  themselves  as  distinctly  Arab  leaders  of 
the shi`a, in opposition to Iranian influences. 
1 Grand ayatollah Muhammad Hussayn Fadl Allah while meeting 
journalists of different Lebanese newspapers:   http://arabic.bayynat.
org.lb/mbayynat/nachatat/mokabala_15072009.htm#4 [Arabic] and 
http://arabic.bayynat.org.lb/nachatat/mokabala_15072009_1.htm 
[Arabic].
2  ‘Qablan  Congratulates  President  Ahmadinejad  on  Landslide 
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Recommendations
   Currently, the EU and the United States have 
a  ‘wait-and-see’  attitude  towards  the  Iranian 
government.  Engagement  with  the  regime 
continues, Iran’s sovereignty is acknowledged, 
but  the  violence  during  the  crackdown  is 
cautiously  condemned.  Arguably,  this  will 
prove  the  most  fertile  approach,  if  not  the 
only one possible. The West has little to gain 
by using bold language or shift to rash punitive 
measures.  In  doing  so,  it  would  add  to  the 
impression, raised by the Iranian government, 
of  being  actively  involved  in  the  troubles, 
strengthening  the  regime’s  claims  of  foreign 
interference. Thus the regime could win greater 
support amongst the lower classes of society (at 
home  and  abroad)  and  marginalize  political 
dynamism in Iran. 
   Engagement with Iran is not to be questioned; 
some observers even see the outstretched hand 
of  president  Obama  as  a  factor  creating  the 
current  political  dynamics.  In  the  long  run, 
engagement is the only way for the West of 
being able to keep different crucial issues on the 
table and to keep a link with the Iranian people. 
At the same time, however, the west has to speak 
out against violent excesses and to watch over 
its interests in the region, considering further 
measures if they are seriously threatened.
   Though Western governments might not like 
it, it is clear that they will have to deal with 
the administration of Mr. Ahmadinajad. There 
is no other option. As the exact nature of the 
election results remains a point of discussion 
amongst  observers,  it  seems  impossible  to 
know  whether  Mr.  Ahmadinajad  has  indeed 
lost the elections. Also, it is highly improbable 
that Mr. Musavi would have enough leverage 
in Iran’s fragmented political scene if he were 
to  be  president.  At  the  moment,  there  does 
not seem to be any form of united opposition, 
representing the whole of Iranian society, giving 
a workable and stable alternative for the current 
regime.
   The sensitivity and ambiguity of the current 
situation  has  to  be  taken  into  account.  The 
EU must be extremely cautious and selective 
in choosing its partners in Iran and the region. 
Openly  supporting  politically  marginal 
opposition  groups,  just  because  they  are 
‘opposing the regime’, is a counterproductive 
form of ‘Cold War logic’, which could damage 
further possibilities for dialogue and Europe’s 
diplomatic clout in Iran, even with reformist 
groups. 
   In the current atmosphere, projections of western 
ideals would be a great mistake. The EU has to 
deal with the country within the framework of 
its own form of government. There is no uniform 
demand from the Iranian people for a change in 
the very nature of their state, on the contrary. 
The current controversy is exactly about clinging 
on to the ideals of the 1979 Revolution, and the 
Islamic state in Iran. It is the apparent slide of the 
country towards an autocratic system that brings 
people to the streets.
   As for Iranian foreign policy, in the short term 
we do not have to expect great differences or 
shifts in the allegiance of Iran’s sympathizers. 
Western  policy-makers  will  have  to  consider 
the stabilizing role of certain regional players in 
the Middle East when choosing their partners, 
rather  than  marginalizing  them  on  the  basis 
of  their  relations  with  Iran.  These  contacts, 
however, have to remain under a close watch, 
and possible excesses of parties involved must 
be condemned.
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